Why do coalition governments form




















The EFF proposes to gradually abolish the tender system and instead employ residents to perform services that are provided by external services providers whereas the DA argues for more transparency in the tender processes. While both agree that procurement-fraud is a problem, they vary in how they will achieve this objective. Assuming that the two parties are governing together, how will they address the issue of tender-fraud before the council?

Therefore the parties must, if possible, aim to find coalition partners with similar ideologies to avoid conflict that may emerge from this basis. However, in practice, there is only a limited number of parties to choose from, and they may not necessarily be the most compatible coalition partner.

This also reinforces the need to devise incentives for cooperation. Also, it cannot be denied that, given the apartheid history of South Africa, race is a divisive issue that can further complicate building and sustaining coalitions. Racial politicking is destructive to maintaining cohesion in coalitions. For coalitions to be sustainable, coalition partners must exercise their decisions within the confines of the Constitution. After the political parties have decided that they will enter a coalition together, the next step is to negotiate the programme for the government.

Each political party must use this opportunity to include its main policy goals as envisaged in their election manifestos. The parties must determine which policy goals of the respective coalition partners will be included in the final coalition agreement, that will be fixed for five years or until it is renegotiated.

In this regard, it is useful to determine areas of commonality that will be easier to pursue and to rule out policy goals that may give rise to conflict between coalition partners. The coalition partners must devise a written coalition agreement to cement the full range of agreements and compromises made in the bargaining process. The coalition agreement must set out, among other things, the policy priorities of the coalition, how portfolios will be allocated in the coalition, structures and procedures for decision-making and dispute resolution which may involve senior party structures , and the general rules of coalition behaviour.

Portfolio distribution: Consider portfolio saliency to the respective coalition partners. Portfolio distribution refers to the structuring of the mayoral or executive committee where each member will have control over a particular portfolio that corresponds with the departments of the municipality.

In portfolio allocation, it is worthwhile to consider the brand of the political party in the coalition. The value that each party attaches to a portfolio is linked to its party-brand. Therefore, the various portfolios must be evaluated to determine the degree to which the portfolio will enable a coalition partner to reflect their brand and achieve their policy goals.

What is it that the potential coalition partner wants to achieve and how can the portfolios be allocated to meet this objective? However, the party cannot do this if, for example, they receive a portfolio in corporate services and governance. In this case, cooperating in the coalition government may not be electorally rewarding to the Green party which may, in turn, cause the party to become uncooperative and potentially destabilise the coalition. Conversely, if the Green party in the above example, is afforded the portfolio of socio-economic development, the party can likely achieve its electoral commitments whilst cooperating in the coalition government.

Strategic allocation of portfolios, therefore, constitutes an incentive for cooperation in the coalition government. Cooperation in the coalition may also be strengthened if parties feel that they are getting the best deal from their membership in the coalition. This is already a legal requirement in the executive committee system which does not apply to mayoral committees. Cabinets based on a group of parties that command a majority in parliament tend to be more stable and long-lived than minority cabinets.

While the former is prone to internal struggles, they have less reason to fear votes of no confidence. Majority governments based on a single party are typically even more stable, as long as their majority can be maintained. Example: during wartime, economic crisis. The coalition probably benefited the CCF; it certainly damaged the Liberals and Conservatives, who were soon supplanted by Social Credit. In Ontario , the minority Liberal government of David Peterson governed from to with an explicit written agreement with the NDP.

However, it was not a coalition agreement in the strict sense because NDP members were not appointed to Cabinet or given any authority. The NDP did however have influence on policy and legislation. The Liberal government of Premier Christy Clark was narrowly returned to power in British Columbia after the provincial election on 9 May Having won 43 seats, the Liberals were in a position to form the first minority government in the province since With 87 seats in the legislature, 44 seats were required for a majority.

However, the intention was to run a minority NDP government buoyed by Green support, rather than form a true coalition government with joint Cabinet. See also Minority Government. Search The Canadian Encyclopedia. Remember me. I forgot my password. Why sign up? Create Account. Suggest an Edit. Enter your suggested edit s to this article in the form field below. Accessed 11 November



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